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Herr  Prasident,  Herr  Regierender Blirgermeister, 
meine  Damen  und  Herren. 
I  have  frequently visited Berlin.  It is always 
a  stimulus  and  mostly,  except when  the  sombre  challenges 
you  have  faced  make  inappropriate  such  a  wbrd,  a 
great pleasure.  I  am  told that  there  is an  old 
saying that "Berlin  ist_ eine  Reise wert".  That  is 
in my  view  a  notable  understatement.  I  always 
appreciate  the  special  and  indomitabl~ vitality of 
your city. 
On  previous  occasions  I  came  as  a  British  ~finister 
or Parliamentarian;  this  time  I  come  as  President  of 
the  Commission  of the  European  Communities,  and  in 
doing  so,  after visits by  my  predecessors  in office, 
I  continue  an  already well  established tradition. 
I  Berlin is  not  only - 2  -
Berlin is not  only  a  metropolis  and West  ~erlin 
a  major  centre of business  in Germany,  but  also 
the  fourth largest city in  the Community  and  one 
of its most  outstanding cultural  and  scientific  '· 
centres.  Since  coming  into office,  I  have  had  the 
opportunity of a  wide  range  of visits to  different 
parts  of the  Community.  I  attach considerable 
importance  to these visits,  because  a  great part 
of the strength of  Europ~'s future  lies  in  the 
richness  and  diversity of its regions  and  in the 
people who  live,  work  and  do  business  in them. 
I  should  like  to talk to  you  this  evening 
about  some  of the principal  issues  that are  now  facing 
the  European  Communities.  Let  me  start with a  moment 
of retrospect  :  the construction of Europe  in  the 
fifties  and  sixties was  born  out  of the  radical 
. 
aspirations  of the people  channelled by  the  courageous 
leadership of a  few  statesmen,  and  as  a conscious 
rejection of the past,  as  a  rejection of  two  European 
civii wars  in this century  and of the  economic  and 
. . 
political nationalism which  led to  them.  This 
determined  and  imaginative thrust  towards  unity 
opened  up  hitherto rigid national  fronti~rs and 
created  a  real  Common  Market.  It was  a  revolutionary 
framework.  It underpinned  the  re-establishment of 
Europe's  economic wealth  and  the well-being of our 
society.  An  unique  historic chance  was  taken  and 
turned to  the benefit  of Europe  as  a  whole. 
I  In  the  lat0 sixties - 3  -
In the  late sixties  and  early seventies  some 
of the momentum  was  lost,despite a  sense of real 
potential.  Relatively favourable  economic  conditions 
seemed  to provide  a  soft pillow for what  can now, 
with hindsight,  be  seen as  a·  false  surge  to  European 
integration.  It.established,  understandably at the 
time,  the  idea that progress  towards  the  ambitious  aim  of 
economic  and  monetary  union would  come  about painlessly 
more  or  less  automatically.  But  the  ideas  of automatic 
action proved  illusory.  We  have  !eared from  that 
e~perience.  Easy  times  can certainly induce  optimism, 
but  the  translation of such  optimism into action needs 
a  sustained act  of  common  political will.  We  shall  not  back 
our  way  quietly and  naturally into  economic  and monetary  union, 
and it may  be  - and  this  I  believe personally - that 
our present difficulties may  be  more  of a  spur  than 
our  successes  of  th~ past  .. 
There  is  a  vital difference  between  the  economic 
situation of today and the  'easy'  high  growth  economies 
to which  we  became  so  used  during. the  last decades. 
The  world's  economic  climate has  chan~ed markedly 
and  the  European  Community,  which more  than  any 
other trading.entity lives  on  international 
trade,  is deeply affected.  Virtually all our 
traditional  economic  terms  of  reference  are  under 
review. 
First,  a  world monetary  system,  as  we  knew  it for  the 
25  years  of Bretton Woods  no  longer  exists.  Major  cracks 
/began  to  appear - 4  -
began  to  appea~ in  1968;  by  1971  it was  acknowledged 
that the  system was  finished.  The  situation now  is 
mar~ed by  a  dollar  in decline,  unable  if not unwilling 
to sustain alone  the entire role of underpinning  the 
monetary·arrangements  of the world . 
. Second,  there  is the  problem of inflation. 
This still threatens major parts  of the  Comm~nity. 
Some  European  countries,  in the  aftermath of the  197 3  oil  ~(' 
price rises,  almost  learned to  live,  precariously and 
profligately,  ~ith doubl~ figure  inflation.  We  have 
learned  from  that  expe~~nce, the  situation is much 
imporved,  but  in  a  fragi·le  overall  economic  situation 
the  risk of a  sudden  spiral of price rises is still 
there. 
Third,  unemployment  has  increased  everywhere. 
Today it has  reached  the  f'igure  of 6!  million within 
the  Community,  about  40%  of whom  are  under  25.  Due 
to the particular demographic  situation inthe 
Community,  about  9  million more  young  people 
will  come  on  to  the  labour market  in  the  next  six years 
'  . 
than will  leave it.  Neither  inflatidn nor  such 
historically high  unemployment  levels,  nor  the 
sluggishness  of the  Community  economy,  can  any 
longer  be  blamed  on  an  imported oil price crisis 
now  five  years  old.  That  shock  should  have  been 
absorbed;  the  problems  we  now  face  are  not  transient. 
Fourth,  the  Community  faces  acute  problems  in 
relation to  what  is  now  becoming  known  as  "the 
/int'Prnational - 5  -
international division of  labour".  Its interest in the 
maintenance  and  development  of an  open world  trading  system 
is immense.  It is much  more  dependent  upon  external 
trade  than  the United States  (14%  of European  GDP, 
compared  with  8%  of US  GDP).  Moreover,  we  have 
a  specially close  interest  in the  Third World. 
This  is true  on  both the political and  the  trading 
levels.  We  have  been  in the  lead  in the  North/South 
dialogue.  We  have  invested  a  lot of political capital 
in this relationship.  The  Lome  Convention has  been 
one  of our major  successes.  We  are  on  the  threshold 
of its renegotiation.  And  our trade  is 
proportionately much  more  with the  developing 
countries  than is that  of either the  United  States 
or Japan.  It is  from  the Third World,  together with 
the non-Community  countries  of Europe  that our  surpluses 
come,  and,  which  put  us  in approximate balance,  in spite 
of our massive  deficits with the other  two  great 
industrialised countries,  and with  OPEC.  Yet  we 
are  competitively very vulnerable,  not  only to Japan 
and  to other  Far  Eastern countries which  have  developed  .  . 
in its wake,  but  also  to  the  'industrialised pockets' 
in the Third World  proper.  The  bilateral negotiations 
we  have  had  to  conduct  to  make  possible  a  renewal  of 
the Multi  Fibre Arrangement  are  a  striking example,• 
but  no  more  than  an  example. 
The  tight~rope that we  have  to tread is therefore 
a  very narrow  one,  and  like all tight-ropes it cannot 
be  trod indefinitely.  The  intervals we  have  won  for 
a  number - 6  -
a  number  of threatened industries  must  be  used with 
speed  for  restructuring,  although this  in itself 
involves  a  loss  of  jobs.  But  the  alternative is 
gwowing  and permanent  uncompetitiveness.  We  are  in 
more  than proportionate difficulties in stagnant 
world  trading conditions.  Yet  we  cannot easily 
turn  inwards,  for  the  reasons  given above.  We  should 
therefore  aim hard at  a  s_uccessful  result  to. the.Multi-
lateral Trade  Negotiations,  the  outcome  of which, 
apart  from  their direct effects  on  trading relations 
in the  1980s,  w'ill  also  have  a  more  immediate  and 
'trigger'  effect upon ·determining whether or not 
the world,  more  delicately balanced  in this  respect 
than  for  a  generation,  turns protectionist. 
The  divergence  between  the  economies  of the  Nine 
has  increased rather  than  diminished.  From  1974  to  1977  the 
increase  in prices  in the Nine  Member  States  of the 
Community  ranged  from  25%  to more  than  100%,  the  economic 
growth between  -1%  and  +10%.  The  North/South  gap 
within  the  Community  has  deepened  further.  Moreover, 
the prospect  of  enlargement  of the  Community  from  nine 
.  .  . 
to  twelve  Member  State~ gives  a  new  dimension  to  a 
number  of  the problems  which already exist,  and  inevitably 
makes  them still more  urgent  and  acute. 
Enlargement  adds  to  the  size of the  problems  we 
face,  but it does  not  fundamentally alter their nature. 
Moreover,  we  have  a  clear political  obligation to  open 
the  door  to  democratic  European  states who  are  anx1ous 
and  qualified to  join.  The  recent  emergence  of 
I  '·· ic - 7  -
democratic  reg.imes  in the  three  applicant nations 
calls for  a  full-hearted,  positive response  from  the 
Community.  But  at  the  same  time,  we  have  to  ensure 
that the.  enlargement  of the  Community  does  not  lead 
to a  weakening  and  a  dilutiQn of the process  of 
Community  integration.  This  is the real challenge 
of enlargement. 
If we  fail to tackle this  combination of issues, 
they will threaten what  we  have  already achieved.  They 
all require joint action at  Community  level.  To  an 
unprecedented  extent  the  serious  problems  which all 
Member  States  of  the  Community  face  :  unemployment, 
inflation, monetary disorder,  protectionism in world 
trade,  energy  and  industrial problems,  all require  for  their 
solution common  discipline  and  common  solidarity.  In part 
this results,  and  rightly,  from  the  signal  successes  of 
the  early years  of  forming  the  Common  Market.·  The  inter-
penetration of our  economies  is  now  a  reality;  more 
than half of our Member  States'  exports  goes  to  other 
States of the  Community.  In such  a  situation no  one 
can hide  behind national  borders,  give"a national 
aid here,  try to  reshape  an  industrial  sector  there. 
Su.ch  a  haphazard  course will  damage  others  and  that 
in turn will  feed  back  on  our mutual  prospects. 
Norie  of the Member  States,  not  even  the  strongest, 
can pretend that within  our  Community  it is 
possible to  have  an  oasis  of stability and  prosperity 
in an  unstable  continent. 
/The  stronger - 8  -
The  stronger countries within  the  Community 
depend  substantially on exports  to  the  weaker 
members.  There  is  no  sufficient margin  of  demand 
in their national markets  to maintain  a  high rate 
of economic  growth  and  mcombat  unemployment.  The 
locomotive  theory  has  been  discarded,  in  my  view 
rightly.  If we  are to  employ  any  railway metaphor, 
all the  engines  involved  must  pull  out  of  the  station 
together.  One  alone will not  be  enough.  To  change 
the  analogy for  a  moment,  we  cannot  hope  to  get  out 
of the morass  by pulling at  our  own  hair,  like 
Baron  von Mllnchhausen.  In  such  a  situation a  clear 
and  coherent  sense  of direction is vital. 
Last  October,  in a  lecture at the  European 
University of Florence,  I  spoke  about  the  need  for  a 
new  economic  impulse  on a.historic scale.  I  there 
outlined my  belief that this  can  be  given  in ·the 
Community  by  a  redefined  and  faster  move  towards 
economic  and  monetary  ~nion.  I  do  not  underestimate 
the difficulties  lying  ahead  of us.  I  do  not  assune 
th~t success  can  be  instantaneous,  but"I  do  believe 
that it p~ovides a  sense  of direction which  can  enable 
us  to establish the necessary  links  between  shorter 
term  decisions  and  the  longer  term perspective. 
Last  December,  the  Commission  put its ideas  to 
the  European  Council,  which  gave  a  positive  'fair wind' 
to  the  relaunching  of the debate  on  economic  and 
monetary  union.  A mandate  was  given  to  the  Commission 
to prepare - 9  -
to prepare  the  necessary initiatives  and  to carry 
the  discussion into  the other Community  institutions. 
Meanwhile,  a  major  debate  on  economic  and monetary 
union  has  taken place  in the  European  Parliament,  and 
we  have  received  encouraging  support  from  many 
politicians,  trade union  and  European business 
leaders.  The  discussion at  the  Copenhagen  Summit 
of last weekend  marked  out clearly the pressing 
relevance  of the  issue  - but  I  will  return to  the 
results  of that  Council  in my  conclusion. 
Of  course,  there  are  sceptics.  But  they are  there 
to be  convinced.  Some  German  observers  might  be 
tempted  to think that  the  sole  objective of our 
policy was  to  draw  on  German  monetary  reserves  or 
to  impose  greater financial  sacrifices  upon  the 
German  taxpayer. 
This  is not  the case.  First,  any  attempt  at 
establishing national profit  and  loss  accounts  within 
the  Community  is necessarily an  imprecise  and  hazardous 
exercise.  Many  economic  benefit~ flowing  from  the 
.  - Community  do  not pass  through  the  budgets.  Some , 
mostly political,  are  simply unquantifiable.  In 
fact,  Germany  has  done  well  out  of its uninterrupted 
access  to  the markets  of its main  customers,  and  this 
is one  of the  key  elements  of the  common  market. 
Moreover,  each Member  State  inevitably contributes 
according  to  its relative  economic  strength so  the 
/German  financial - .1 0  -
German  financial  contribution to  the  Community  is 
higher  than many,  but·  not  all, others.  For  example, 
the  annual  per capita contribution of the  German 
taxpayer  to  the European  budget  "\-vas  1 49  Deutschmarks 
in 1977,  compared with  192  for  the  Belgians  and  205 
for  the  Dutch. 
Personally  I  have  ~ good  deal  of  sympathy  for 
that German  point  of view that  says  that  the  transfer 
to  the  Community  of substantial financial  resources 
alone would  be  neither  in its own  nor  the  Community's 
interest unless  accompan:Led  by  real political progress 
towards  further  European  integration.,  I  agree.  We 
need  common,  or at  the least,  coordinated policies, 
common  macro-economic  targets,  common  monetary  discipline, 
common  orientations  for  our  industrial or  energy policies. 
For  that we  need  the  leadership of all,  not  one,  but 
Germany  is  exceptionally well  situated  to  take  a  lead 
here  and to play  a  strong  'political'  if not  'locomotive' 
role. 
Of  course  -,  if we  are  to  adopt  su~h common  policies, 
they must  involve  money.  But  this  is not  in my  view  a 
key  objection or  stumbling  block  to  further  advance.  We 
are not  talking of relatively huge  figures.  The  budget 
of the  Community  is  only  about  2.5%  of  the  nationa~ 
budgets  of the  Nine.  That  is little more  than the 
double  of your budget  here  1n  Berlin.  Three-quarters 
of this  Community  budget  goes  into agricu1ture,  wi'  :h 
leaves  not  much  more  than half of the total budget  of 
Berlin  for  the  vast  areas  of social,  regional,  energy, 
industrial  and  other policies.  I  do  not,  I'i<'·  ,tioning - 11  -
agriculture,  raise questions  about  the merits  of 
the  Common  Agricultural  Policy.  It is a  corner 
stone of  the  Community.  But  in the  context of the 
whole  range  of pressing  Community  problems,  its 
relative financial  share  in undoubtedly  too  great . 
. I  do  not wish  again to  develop  today  t4e  full 
range  of arguments  for  a  faster  advance  in the 
economic  and  monetary  field,  which  I  have  already 
set·1out  elsewhere,  but  I  should  like to  emphasise 
two  points. 
First,  we  need  a  stronger  underpinning  to  the 
Community  internal market.  Member  States with strong 
currencies  need  the  impulse  of demand  which  their 
own  national  markets  can  no  longer  supply.  Intra-
Community  trade  grew  by  only  2%  in  1977  compared 
with  a  yearly average  of  9%  in the  previous 
decade.  Being  able  to  do  business  all over  the 
Community  within  a  single  currency would  considerably 
reduce  formalities  and  remaining  barriers at  intra-
Community  frontiers.  ·A  lot remains.to  be  done  here, 
and  further progress  on  dismantling unnecessary 
barriers is  a  good  example  of the way  in which practical 
steps  can  be  taken  towards  an  eventual,  and  necessary, 
jump  to  a  full  monetary  union. 
~There are  no  customs  barriers  inside  the  Community 
any more.  But  there  are still other businesses,  too 
many  of them,  and  everyone  who  trades with  or  travels 
/to other parts - 12  -
to other parts of the  Community  knows  how  difficult 
some  of these hurdles  can be.  There  are  technical 
barriers,  affecting,  say,  exhaust  fumes  or braking 
devices  in motor  cars.  In these  areas it is 
not  simply  a  question of Commission officials 
obsessively pressing  on with unnecessary harmonisation. 
The  pur.pose  is  a  very  serious  one.  There are  also 
fiscal barriers because  ~tion  and  the  whole 
system of fiscal  renevue  varies  from  one  country 
to  the  other.  Buying  a  c~r in Germany,  for  instance, 
--
involves  a  TVA  of  12%.  ffin  Belgium  the  rate  is  25%, 
in France  33%.  Progres~ bas  been made  with the 
Sixth Directive  on  TVA,  but  there  is still a  long 
way  to  go  until Community  travellers  are  free  of 
the  surveillance  of  customs.-:  officers at  internal 
ftontier posts.  It is  a  welcome  comfort  when 
travelling between  Belgium and  Holland  to  fi~d a 
simple  traffic light,  always  showing  green,  instead 
of a  traveller's control. 
But  progress  towards  economic  and.monetary  union  .. 
does,  of course,  not  only affect  our  intra-Community 
r.elationship~,  but  also  - and  this  is of equal 
importance  - our political  and  our  economic position 
with  the rest of  the world.  This  is the  second point 
I  wish  to  emphasise. 
It is not  suitable for  us  merely  to  complain  about  the 
steady decline  of  the dollar  and  the  breakdown  of  the  inter-
national monetary  system.  We  shall all continue  to  depend 
on  the  dollar,  and  the Vice-President  of  the - l  j 
• 
German  Bundesb.ank,  as well  as  others,  have  pointed 
out  in the  last  few  days  how  seriously the crisis of the 
dollar also affects  the  competitive power  of the 
German·  economy.  But  it is clear now  that  the 
dollar alone  cannot  carry the  burdens  and  responsibilities 
of being  the  oniy effective  international medium  of exchange. 
In these circumstances  we  in Europe  must  urgently consider 
possible contributions  from  our side which  might 
help  to create order out  of the current disorder. 
The  Community's  collective weight  is  far  greater than 
its monetary  influence.  The  Community  has  the 
alternative and 
economic  strength to create  a  new  an /strong 
international  currency  • 
- ..... ·!.· 
..:..  The  Community  is the  right size of unit 
for this purpose  and  would  by  its own  weight  - we  are 
the biggest  trading entity in the  world  ;heln  - 1mpart  a 
new  stability to  the  international monetary  system. 
Again,  progress  in this field could be  an 
.  of adyance.  .  h  b  .  f  h  1mportant avenue;.  Even  w1t  out  em  rac1ng  or  t  e 
present  the  full  advantages  or  rigouts  of  economic 
and  monetary union,  there is  scope  for  the Community 
to develop  new  dimensions  to  the  use  of the  European 
Unit  of Account.  It could  serve  as  a  point  of 
reference  and  a  unit  of account  for  credit  and 
settlement  in our  internal  exchange  rate operations. 
It could  be  used  as  a  reference  in international 
contracts of private business.  It might  play  a  greater 
role  in Euro-currency operations  and  in transactions 
between  public authorities.  It could  be  tested  in - 1:4  -
the  Community's  own  borrowing  and  lending  operations. 
There  is  a  large  scope  of  immediately possible  action 
which would  open  up  an  important  avenue  towards 
our  longer-term goals. 
I  elaborated my  ideas  on  this  subject at the 
European  Council  in Copenhagen,  and  in my  view 
the  discussion was  particularly fruitful  and 
interesting.  We  want  between  now  and  the  next 
European  Council  at Bremen  to  pursue  this 
vigorousl!.y :and  "1'/0aTk  out  new  dimensions  of 
Community  activity in the  longer  term perspecitve 
of economic  and  monetary union.  In  my  view we  should 
begin by  seeking greater  exchange  rate stability 
between  the  currencies  of Member  States  of the 
Community,  and  thus  a  stronger basis  on  which  to 
deal  more  effectively in.exchange  rate policy with 
third countries.  For  this purpose it would  in 
the  judgement  of the  Commission  be  necessary  to  extend 
the  Community  exchange  rate  system beyond  the  snake, 
give  a  new  dimension to  the  use  of  European 
Unit  of Account,  and  increase  the  f1.1nctions  and 
resources  of the  European Monetary  Cooperation  Fund. 
We  have  relatively little:time in which  to work 
if the  Bremen  European  Council  is to arrive at 
any  conclusions  on  these major  questions.  It will 
cif  course  be  followed  quickly  be  the  Western  Economic 
Summit  in Bonn  on  16  and  17  July.  I  hope  it wi1·· 
be  possible  for  the  Community  to  work  out  a  comrnon 
c 
position and  make  a  strong contribution to  the  work  J 
In~  ~ha~  ~PP~~no.  J 
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of that meeting.  It will deal  with the  inter-
relating problems  common  to all industrial 
countries  and will,  as  I  hope,  lead to  a  more 
concerted way  of  dealing with  them.  In  this 
the  Community  has  a  major part  to  play.  It 
can  only play it effectively if its members  act 
together. 
For  too  long Member  States  have  tried to 
grapple  on  their  own  with the  consequences  of 
the most  serious  economic  crisis  since  the war. 
We  have  failed  to  meet  the  expectations  of 
citizens in our  duty to  provide  the  right to 
work.  We  have  wasted  too  much  effort  in arguing 
about  whose  responsibility it was  to  go  for  higher 
economic  growth.  It is  time  that  such  arguments 
were  stilled,  because  we  now  need  to  act  together, 
not  simply because  we  should,  but  because  we  must. 
It is all  too  easy  to  raise  then  dash  expectations. 
But  I  firmly believe there is  now  a  real  opportunity 
for  the  Community.  Indeed,  it may  be. that  the 
C  .  .  b  h  /the·  d  .  ommun1ty  1s  a  out  to  approac  secon  maJor  cross-
roads  in its history.  The  first move  to  European 
integration arose  out  of post-war  depression  and 
reconstruction.  We  then  failed  in  the  good  years•of 
the  sixties  to  take  advantage  of our  strength.  It may 
seem  to  some  ironic, but  indeed it is historically 
logical  as  well  as  necessary,  that  in this period 
of European  and  international difficulty,  we  may  be 
able  to  make  a  new  and  great  advance. 